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Section III.
Transcription of the Lecture “Globalization and the
Crisis of Culture and Religion”
Olivier Roy
At its center, this lecture focuses on the crisis of culture and religion – which essentially
condenses to a crisis of the state, as globalization is bypassing the state – by addressing
Islamic fundamentalism and by providing a more global view on the topic. Fundamen-
talism is not a product of tradition, but a modern phenomenon – a result as well as an
active player of globalization. It disconnects religion and the concept of revelation from
culture (as is the case in Salafism). Thus, an iconoclastic concept of culture and history has
emerged (e.g. Daesh in Saudi Arabia). There are common traits between different kinds
of fundamentalisms: an explicit system of norms and a social life, which reduces life to
living in a faith community with high distrust towards society in general. A problem in the
contemporary globalized world is the need tomake everything explicit, which is opposed
to culture. This trend reflects nothing but a normative system that can only be im-
plemented in an authoritarian way. What follows is the crisis of culture – the destruction
of the very concept of culture – that such a type of globalization promotes. Breaking this
cycle entails refraining from indulging in this kind of systematic “normatization” of
everyday life and trying to reopen a space not only between believers and nonbelievers,
but between everyone. Ultimately, this calls for the need to reopen the discussion on the
relationship between culture and religion in practice.
Globalization; Crisis; Culture; Religion; Fundamentalism; Iconoclasm; Explicit; Norms;
Normatization; Identity
Olivier Roy studies philosophy, political sciences and also Persian language and civi-
lization at the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales. He currently
works at the European University Institute in Florence. His fields of research are Af-
ghanistan, Iran, the Middle-East, Central Asia, Christianism, Conversions, Islam, Is-
lamism, religious fundamentalism, civil society and religion. His field works include
Political Islam, Middle East, Islam in the West and comparative religions.
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Introduction
Globalization entails a crisis of the very concept of culture. How can we build a
political society if we do not share culture at a local or global level? A political
society is built on somethingwe have in common. It!s an identity. It could bemany
things: a social or political contract, an ethnicity, a language, a history, a tradition.
By definition in ourmodern societies it is usually connected to the state. The state
is, in a sense, the representation of the society. We can discuss political repre-
sentation inside the state, but the state in itself is a representation of the society.
What we have now is the crisis of the state, because globalization is bypassing the
state. The construction of Europe is a very concrete case of local globalization, if I
may call it that. So what we see as its revenants (fundamentalism, populism) only
form part of a mutation of the relationship to culture. Modern populism is not the
same as old populism. It!s not fascism. It!s not Nazism. Of course we come across
some common elements like xenophobia, the quest for a Duce and so on; but in
terms of norms and values, modern populism is farmore complex than it seems. In
my lecture I will start with Islamic fundamentalism and proceed to a more global
outlook.
1. Islamic Fundamentalism: a Product of the Crisis of Culture
The problem with Islamic fundamentalism is that it is commonly perceived as
something coming from the past, from a traditional, medieval kind of Islam;
medieval is a termvery often used to qualify this kind of Islam.The problem is that
there never was such an Islam in medieval times. In a sense, as far as Islam is
concerned, medieval times were far more enlightened. Another issue is theology:
what in Islamic theology triggeredwhatwe consider to be fundamentalism today?
For instance there is an entire debate on the term “jihad” and the unsubstantiated
idea that Islam lacks reformation in order to be adapted to modern times. The
question is how a theology called Salafism could be revivified. We had a confer-
ence inBeirut twomonths ago on religion and violence, in which all the professors
of Islamic Sunni Theology of the University of Beirut said: “When I was a young
student nobody was speaking about Ibn Taymiyyah, nobody was speaking about
the Salafi. Now we are confronted with Wahhabism, these strange guys in Saudi
Arabia, the Bedus, but we used to teach falsafa, philosophy, at the universities and
I do not understand how we could get from this kind of culture of enlightened
Islam at the faculty of Theology to this kind of Salafi teaching. It is not traditional
Islam at all – it!s new.” My own research shows that fundamentalism in general,
not just in Islam, is not a protest of tradition against modernity and globalization.
It is, on the contrary, a product and an actor of globalization. Why? Because the
strength of this kind of fundamentalism is that it explicitly disconnects religion
and culture. Salafism is totally opposed to culture. What is its theological basis?
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2. Salafi Iconoclasm: Erasing Culture and History
The theological basis that can be found in Ibn Taymiyyah and Abd al-Wahhab is
that you cannot knowGod, so there is no possible contact. It corresponds to a sort
of negative theology. We know God only through his will. We cannot interpret,
because if we interpret, that would mean that we can think like God, which is not
the case. So we have to take the revelation as something which is not and should
not be historical or connected to any culture at all. Everything that happened at
the time of the prophet is without interest and at worst heresy and paganism.
Salafism puts three things on themarket: firstly, norms (dos and don!ts), secondly,
explicit norms, since there is nothing implicit there, and thirdly, the absence of a
connection to a specific society. So Salafism is a toolkit which works everywhere,
in any circumstances. There is clearly an iconoclastic concept of culture and his-
tory. If you look at SaudiArabia – it systematically destroyedwhat could be called
Saudi culture, Saudi archeology, Saudi history, Saudi tradition. The result is Las
Vegas plus Sharia, which is Medina today. But it is less fun than Las Vegas. In this
sense, with Daesh, we have the explicit dimension of iconoclasm: they want to
destroy everything which is linked to history. This is very interesting because, in a
sense, Daesh is the logic of Salafism carried out until the end – and with the end I
mean the apocalypse. They have no faith in the future. A just Islamic society is not
sustainable for them; it!s just the prefiguration of the coming of theAntichrist. To
make the coming of the Antichrist happen, they have to get rid of everything that
belongs to the past. There is also an interesting dimension of negation of ge-
nealogy which is very strong in Daesh. Instead of speaking about a religious
ideology, we should see Daesh as a narrative.
3. The Generational Dimension
If you look at the profiles of the people who join Daesh either to perpetrate
terrorist actions or to fight jihad, there are two figures: second generation Mus-
lims and converts. They do not join just because they belong to a second gen-
eration of whose parents came toEurope in the 60s and 70s or because it is normal
to be a Salafist in this situation. No, we have had second generations in radical
terrorism for 22 years. They arrived in 1995, and since then there has been the
same profile. We don!t have a third generation. After such a long period of time,
there should be a third generation, purely in the interest of demographics.
However, there appears to be only a first generation, a second generation, and
converts, whose profile has been the same since 1997.When looking at origins, it is
evident in Germany, for instance, that only 10 % of the radicals have Turkish
origins, although the Turks represent at least two thirds of theMuslim population.
Everywhere, the Moroccans are overrepresented: the bulk of the terrorists in
Belgium are Moroccans, as in Holland, as in Denmark, and to a certain extent in
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Germany too. There are a high number of brothers: In every terrorist cell since
1997 until theBataclan there has been at least a pair of brothers, sometimes sisters,
but no fathers. 20 to 25 % of the people who have perpetrated a terrorist attack in
theWest had a child in the year preceding the attack. The best example is the San
Bernardino attack in 2015 in California. The man is a second generation Muslim,
his wife is from Pakistan. They had a little girl and one day, when the little girl was
nine months old, they left the girl at her aunt!s house and went to kill fourteen
people and themselves. All of the people who are sent to Jihad are asked to make
children and all the girls who go to Syria are requested to bemothers. All the men
die in the months following the birth of their sons. So there is a connection to this
very concept of generation.
In addition: before killing themselves, be it in Syria or in Europe, the terrorists
very often call their mother, never their father, and say: “Mother, you are a bad
Muslim, because you will cry once you hear that I am dead. But on the contrary,
you should be very happy. Firstly I am going to paradise and secondly I will bring
you with me.” By doing this, they turn the generational dimension around. The
parents have eternal life thanks to their children. There is this dimension of a
shortcut in history and genealogy, which goes alongwith an apocalyptic vision and
a personal apocalyptic religious idol.Of courseDaesh is the utmost extreme, but it
conforms to the idea that religious life is not sustainable. You cannot live as a good
believer, because you are a sinner. Therefore, you have to catch themoment when
you can go directly to paradise.Referring back to Salafism: Salafism is not suicidal
at all. They believe that life is given byGod for you to learn how to get to paradise.
You must follow the rules, and if you do that for your whole life, it will work out.
There are also explicit dos and don!ts here. There are no grey zones – you are
either in or out. This means that you have a problem with socialization, since you
cannot socialize with “wrong believers” –with Christians. You are only allowed to
socialize within your own community.
4. Two Digressions on the Question of “the Explicit”
Then I worked on Christianity and Evangelicalism. In these cases, the focus is on
honor, which is why one is to be born again and fight a second time. Once one is
born again, one cannot be associated with “wrong believers”. You can preach to
the population, but you cannot socialize with people who do not believe. Here,
everything is also explicit. It means that confessions are public. You cannot even
confess ad auriculum which is very interesting because Catholicism is, what I
would call, the management of the grey zone; secret, implicit and accepting of
conformity. There everything stays between you and your confessor.
These are the common traits between all kinds of fundamentalisms: an explicit
system of norms and a social life reduced to the life in your faith community with
big distrust towards society in general. This creates many problems, because
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norms are non-negotiable. Society either conforms to your set of norms or that
society is considered to be pagan.
1) If we take the Catholic Church for example, we can say that since Humanae
vitae the church has put the issue of norms on the table. The social gap issues like
abortion and gaymarriage were not linked to the church before the 60s. Abortion
was banned in France in 1921 by parliament, without any pressure from the
Church. The criminalization of homosexuality was very common in Western
Europe until the 60s. It was not a request from the Church, it came from society
itself. The 60s were very important, a divorce of values and norms. Suddenly there
were no shared norms between the faith communities and mainstream society.
This gap has widened since then, the last issue being same sexmarriage. There is a
problem in this case because theChurch – theCatholic Church in particular – does
not ask people to followGod!s norms. TheCatholic Church has a concept, namely
natural law, which is precisely the grey zone, the idea that you do not need to be a
believer in order to agree on certain ideas. There canbe consensuswithout sharing
faith. Faith is not compulsory. When the church decided to take to the streets
against gay marriage, Cardinal Barbarin was very clear: it is not because we are
following God, but because the institution of gay marriage is a breach in natural
law, an anthropological revolution. He was right by the way; I think it is an
anthropological revolution. In doing this, he tried to build a coalitionwith the grey
zone – people who are not believers at all – andwithMuslims and Jews, in order to
build a coalition of people who are against gay marriage, not on religious but on
anthropological grounds. The only people who joined him were some Lacanian
psychoanalysts, so it was a great disappointment for the Church. Since this
demonstration, we have had the rise of a Catholic party “Sens commun” for the
first time in France since the toast of Cardinal Lavigerie in 1891. This party goes
into politics with a Catholic program in the name of God. The conference of
bishops is nomore in charge. So the debate is once again on norms, explicit norms.
2) If we look at the other side we find something interesting: what is the other
side? It is freedom, liberty, sexual life and so on. Here, my field work was in
California in 2009. California is 1968 squared, “it!s my choice”, it was the self-
institution of the self, “I do what I want, I create my life”, freedom as the criteria
for building a society – that all started from there. Evangelicalism started from
here too.After spending one year in California, I found that it was one of themost
regulated societies that I know. You have an extraordinary complex of regu-
lations. Everything is regulated. Strangely, it!s a place where everything is sup-
posed to be “my life and my choice”, but then people permanently regulate their
own life. You cannot invite a child, you can only invite your own child!s friend. But
when you do, you have to fixate on everything, at which time he comes, at which
time he leaves, what he will eat; you have to speak with the other parents. If you
invite their kid to a birthday party, you have to check whether they eat kosher,
vegetarian, halal etc. Everything is regulated. So I decided to explore that. It is
now a real problem. For instance, sexual life and the implicit: You have to have a
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ten page contract before asking somebody to date you. Everything has to be
explicit.My children had classes on how to say yes and no, how to ask things – they
were not even ten! They had classes asking them to be explicit about everything
they do. Never touch people. The “explicitation” of normativity, for instance
emotions in emails – they are not that much fun, they are the “explicitation”; you
have to explicitly say what your state of mind is. You cannot make a joke without
adding: “This is a joke!” It is not just California, now it is systematic. I sent a joke
to my secretaries at the institute and they were totally perplexed. They asked me
“What is the status of your email?” I said: “It!s a joke.”-“How fun! Next time put
an emoticon, so we know that it!s a joke.” You cannot make jokes if you do not
explicitly point out that it is one and this trend is going very far in language, for
example.
5. Globish as a Language without Culture
As you know we speak Globish and we will speak more and more Globish once
British is out. When it is no longer in the EU, we will have no cultural references
when we speak English – at least we will understand each other, because the
people who really speak English will not be here. So there will be a creolization of
English, but that will also bring about the “explicitation” of English. If you look at
the English of the European Union: that is not British English at all. Once again
everything has to be understood by someone who is not a native speaker. So there
are words which you will never use. You will never say “siblings” – that would be
too complex – you will say “brothers and sisters”. It will never be more than 2500
words plus your right to use 300 technical words like “benchmark” etc. Then
everything will be contractual, everyday life will becomemore and more judicial.
There is an extension of the regulations to school administrations etc., which are
all based on the same thing: you have to make everything you do and think
explicit. Kill the implicit, which is exactly the same as killing the culture.
The status of culture in court is very interesting. Twenty years ago you could
argue in court that a client perpetrated a crime but he/she was influenced by his/
her culture. Twenty years ago, that was a receivable argument. The judges would
accept it as an excuse, but now it!s an aggravation. The status of female excision
for example: it has changed in the last twenty years. Twenty years ago the an-
thropologists would come to court and say: “They have different customs” and the
court would be lenient, but not at all now. By the way, the courts now have a
tendency not to define that as cultural obligation but as a religious obligation, thus
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6. The Collision between the European and the Christian
Identity
The last point is identity. The identity which is brought up nowby the populists has
nothing to do with culture or history. In what way do we oppose Islam in the
European debate on it? We oppose European values and Europe!s Christian
identity. The only problem is that European values are totally opposed to
Christian values. The German, Belgian and Dutch governments have ques-
tionnaires for visa applicants and immigrants which are all about whether they
accept “our values” and I would say that the pope could not sign such a ques-
tionnaire. In Germany one of the questions is “Do you accept nudity in public
space?” You cannot imagine Cardinal Ratzinger saying “I amGerman, I will tick
that box.” The last thing I found was in Belgium: The Flemish government has a
questionnaire forMoroccans. It says: “Flemish sleep at ten p.m.” and if you look at
all questionnaires, you have an ideal normative life which is the life of nobody, of
course, but is constructed as the national identity. For instance, in those countries
which consider gay rights to form a part of the European identity there is a big
problem, because it means that Catholicism is not part of the European identity;
that you have no right to be a conservative religious man. If you were, you would
not be able to sign this kind of questionnaire. So where are we going with that?
Precisely to the delegation of real cultures which are all based on the implicit. If
you make everything explicit, you have no culture anymore. You only have a
normative system which, by definition, could only be implemented in an au-
thoritarian way. It!s what I call the crisis of culture, the destruction of the very
concept of culture by this kind of globalization. How can we deal with that now?
The first duty is not to indulge in this kind of systematic “normatization” of
everyday life. That is exactly what Francesco Ghia said. We went too far in this
definition of religion as normative. The question is how can we reopen the grey
zone, not only between believers and nonbelievers, but between everybody? The
fact is that we consider religions to determine the everyday life of people – we
have this idea that “a Muslim is a Muslim”, that he has some kind of Koranic
software in his mind and if you want to influence the possibility of a Muslim to
adjust toWestern society you have to go back to that Koranic software, reopen it,
change the concept of “Jihad” and then put it back in. We have a normative
concept of theology, which means that in fact we do not address religiosity or
spirituality in the way a believer experiences his own religion. It has become this
complex area which is not studied anymore, now in our societies we are more and
more religiously illiterate and the most vivid forms of religion are culturally il-
literate because they do not want to address the issue of culture. We have to
reopen the relationship between culture and religion in practice, not by having a
big discussion about it.
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7. Questions and Answers
Q: You said it is a process of globalization and I appreciate the parallels you have
drawn between Salafism and California, but what is it in the process of global-
ization that is driving this?
R: I think globalization is, by definition, a process of “deculturation” through the
loss of traditional or national cultures. It is also a process of mobility and if you
want to bemobile, youmust travel lightlywith as little cultural luggage as possible.
Therefore, you develop some sort of travel kit of how to adapt to societies. This is
why Salafism and Evangelicalism work with people who are mobile, in a sense,
even if it is not so willingly. Those people could be going to California to find a
good job or ordinary immigrants or whatever you might think of. So the second
point is linked to individualism, this kind of normative system– you do not need to
be part of a face community, even though you might think you are part of one,
because very often you meet your face community on the internet. You yourself
can decide, and do it yourself. It is very interesting to see how these people discuss
norms of everyday life between themselves. The infidels wear their watch on their
left hand, so should a goodMuslimwear his watch on the right hand? This kind of
debate is about the little things that showwhoyou are, howyou lead your life. That
also means that it works well for people who are not well socialized. They re-
construct their second generation identity based on a set of formal norms. The
problem is the sustainability of this process: You cannot study a language over ten
years, you need a language that is immediately accessible. Globish is one of these
languages, but the Pentecostalists have glossolalia which is fantastic – you speak
every language.
You do not need a language. God!s word passes from you to someone else
immediately. You do not need cultural mediation. I think this is part of the Pen-
tecostalists! success. Before the internet they invented a way of communicating
immediately without the need of a dictionary or grammar. Normativity is a set of
regulations for everyday life which could take different forms according to con-
text (religious, non-religious); and the domestication of body language is ex-
tremely important. The same thing goes for a Salafi – you should not smile, you
have signs which indicate immediately that you are a Salafi (no moustache) and
the wording, the use of specific vocabulary. There is a Salafi Globish which is very
interesting, because they speak the local language but they have a reservoir of
specific terms that they use only inArabic, e.g. din instead of “religion”, because if
you said religion it could imply that Islam and Christianity are the same thing.
You have some sort of a copyright on expressions; for example inMalaysia, the
law is that Christians are not allowed to use the word Allah, while in Arabic the
term means God. On the secular side, there is the debate on cultural appropria-
tion, which is very interesting. Now if you are not African-American according to
some groups you cannot use signs belonging to the African heritage. There was
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the Dolezal case in the US – she was a girl who represented the black community
in a small city in Montana for years and one day her brother and parents went on
television and said: “But she is not black, we are all white! Blond, blue eyes.” It
was a huge scandal. She lost her job, her husbandwhowas black divorced her, and
she was seen as a traitor by the black community in general (not the local one).
The accusation was that of cultural appropriation because she tried to have rel-
atively dark skin and she combed her hair the African way. “You are not black so
you have no right to use our way of living.” That is very close to what populists are
doing. It is the same thing; “It is our identity.” For instance, the normative ap-
proach of the boycott of white Gospel singers; this is linked to the idea that a
specific type of music and a way of dressing is copyrighted by a specific group.We
used to say that globalization is relation, and now we have the exact opposite; the
reappropriation of cultural elements by people who think that they are the le-
gitimate owners of this or that trait of cultural behavior. Often this leads to court
in the US, but more and more in Europe too. The courts have to make a decision
on this. So here normativity is reinforced. The courts might be relatively liberal
and reject the case, but that means that the case is always deferred to a normative
system however it may work.
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